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"KENTUCKY'S STATUTE AGAINST PERPETUITIES"
Section 2360 of the Kentucky Statutes provides that "the
absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any lim-
itation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during
the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation of the
estate, and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter."
Although this section has been a part of the Kentucky
Statutes since 1852,1 it is still uncertain from the decisions
whether it is an attempt to restate the common law rule against
perpetuities or whether it states a new rule as to the length of
time a restriction on the power of alienation of an estate will be
valid.
In the case of (ammock v. Allen,2 the Court of Appeals
said: "The statute, therefore, has in effect been construed to
apply only to eases and situations where the suspension was due
to the postponement of the vesting of the fee in a person who
could alienate it. If such postponement is beyond the life or
lives of persons in being and twenty-one years and ten months
after the creation of the estate it comes within not only the com-
mon law rule against perpetuities but violates the quoted section
of our statute which was but declaratory of the common law rule
and was intended only as a statute against perpetuities and not
one dealing with the right of alienation by a person in whom the
fee vested within the permissible period prescribed by it." .
"It has been a statute of this state for a long number of years
and has always been treated and referred to in the opinions of
this court as Kentucky's statute against perpetuities."
Three years and a half later the court was called upon to
pass upon the validity of a clause in a will which provided that
2 Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. (1914), 158 Ky. 280, 164
S. W. 939.
2 (1923) 199 Ky. 268, 272; 250 S. W. 963.
KENTUCKY LAW JouBNAL.
the land devised should not be sold for thirty years after a cer-
tain date, December 14, 1915. The testator died eleven days after
that date. The court, in an opinion written by the same justice
who rendered the decision in the Cammack case, held that the re-
straint on -alienation was void because it was forbidden by Sec-
tion 2360 of the Kentucky Statutes 3
In the course of the opinion the court observed, "As we
pointed out iA the recent case of Cammack v. Allen, 199 Ky. 268,
that section of our statutes, which has been of long standing, has
produced"some confusion in prior opinions of this court, i. e.,
some of them seem to have regarded it as one only limiting
restraint on alienation; while others construed it as only one
against perpetuities, and in the case referred to it was held to
be only a statute against perpetuities and that its purpose was
to forbid the vesting of title beyond the periods therein pro-
vided for. However, in the prior case of Saulsberry v. Sauls-
berry, 140 Ky. 608, the section was construed according to its
literal terms as applying to restraints on alienation of vested
titles by the vendees or devisees, and it was therein held, in
substance, that whenever it was possible for the particular re-
straint to extend beyond the periods prescribed in the statute,
although it might also by subsequent circumstances come within
the permissible limits, still it would be void as being obnoxious
to the statutes. It was so held therein under facts exactly
analogous to those we have here. The estate in that case was
created by deed executed in 1896 and it contained a restraint
against alienation prior to the year 1950, or for a period of
54 years."
In both the Cammack case and the Metcalf case the court
was dealing with restraints on alienation of vested estates and
neither involved the rule against perpetuities as that rule is
generally accepted today, a rule against remoteness of vesting.
In less than a month, however, after giving its decision in the
Metcalf case, the court was called upon to consider a case which
did involve the question of a perpetuity. In West v. Ashby
4
there was a devise of a life estate to children and grandchildren
and a fee to the testator's great-grandchildren. Since this gift
*Perry v. Metcalf (1926), 216 Ky. 755, 288 S. W. 694.
* (1926) 217 Ky. 250, 289 S. W. 228.
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to the great-grandchildren might not vest within a life or lives
in beihg after the testator's death and twenty-one years and
ten months, the court held the gift was void as it "created a
perpetuity forbidden by the common law and was in -violation
of Ky. Statutes, sec. 2360." The words quoted from the opinion
show that the court was wholly unmindful of the fact that it
had but a short time before disassociated Section 2360 from the
rule against perpetuities and regarded it as simply fixing a
limit on the privilege of restraining the alienation of a fee.
The court was still unmindful of that fact four months
later when it rendered its opinion in Bowling et at. v. Grace
et al.5 There land was conveyed for school purposes and the
deed contained a provision that when it should not be used for
such purposes it should revert back to the grantors, their heirs
and assigns. In holding this provision valid the court relied
almost wholly upon the earlier decision of Duncan v. Webster
County Board of Education6 which was similar in facts to the
case under consideration, except that the land was to revert to
the person who should at the time be the owner and possessor
of the larger tract of land from which the tract in question was
taken at the time the deed was executed. The court there held
that the attempt to vest the reversionary right in whoever hap-
pened to own the original tract plainly violated Section 2360,
Kentucky Statutes, for it was "not only impossible for the school
board to make absolute title to the lot, but there was no one
else who, joining with it, could do so, nor anyone even with
power to release or quitclaim the limitation or condition attached
to its title." The court did not consider the impossibility of
reserving a right of reverter to a third person under the common
law nor whether that rule had been changed by Section 2341,
Kentucky Statutes, which allows any interest in or claim to real
estate to be disposed of by deed or will in writing.
In Bowling v. Grace a different result was reached as, to
quote from the court, "the absolute power of alienation was not
suspended. The possibility of reverter possessed by the grantors
could have been released at any time unto the holder of the de-
feasible fee, which would have resulted in vesting the fee simple
title to the land in question in the grantee."
5 (1927) 219 Ky. 496, 293 S. W. 964.
0 (1924) 205 Ky. 86, 265 S. W. 486.
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It is in this conception of the rule against perpetuities;
namely, that if it is possible at all times to pass a good title
to the property in question, there is no violation of the rule;
that we find the explanation of all the confusion about section
2360 of the Kentucky Statutes. It goes back to the early English
case of Scatterwood v. Edge.7
It is in the Duke of Norfolk case,8 decided a decade and
a half before the pourt was called upon to give an opinion in
Scatterwood v. Edge, that authorities agree we have the origin
of the modern rule against perpetuities. The need for such a
rule grew out of the holding in the case of PeZls v. Brown0 where
the court had ruled that an executory devise was indestructible,
that the holder of the prior estate could not destroy the subse-
quent estate which was to vest only upon the happening of some
contingency, as he could do in the case of a contingent remainder,
by making a tortious conveyance or suffering a fine. The result
of this decision of PelZs v. Brown was that estates might be tied
up and the title rendered unmarketable for an indefinite time
in the future. This was contrary to the general policy of the
courts who desired to keep the title to land marketable as far
as possible. Lord Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk's case de-
cided there was a limit b~yond which a clog on the title would
not be good.
In explaining what a perpetuity was, he said: "A perpetuity
is the settlement of an estate or an interest in tail, with such
remainders expectant upon it, as are in no sort in the power of
the tenant in tail in possession, to dock by any recovery or
assignment, but such remainders must continue as perpetual
clogs upon the estate; such do fight against God, for they pretend
to such a stability in human affairs, as the nature of them admits
not of, and they are against the reason and the policy of the law,
and therefore not to be endured." A contingency he would hold
good which did not cause an inconvenience and one that would
happen within a life in being would not cause an inconvenience.
In Scatterwood v. Edge the court said that every executory
devise was "a perpetuity as far it goes, that is to say, an
estate unalienable, though all mankind join in the conveyance."
" (1699) 1 Salk. 229.
8 (1682) 2 Ch. Cas. 1.
1 (1620) Cro. Jac. 590.
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From this statement, as has been pointed out by Professor
Gray'0 and others, arose the idea that if there were persons in
being who could release or convey the land subject to a limita-
tion so that if all interested therein could give a good title, the
limitation was not contrary to the rule against perpetuities.
There seemed to be the idea that since an estate which came
within the rule because it did not vest within the time laid down
therein, could not be alienated, it followed that an estate which
could not be alienated during the same length of time
came within the rule. In fact, until Professor Gray published
his masterly work on the subject of perpetuities, the courts
both in this country and England did not clearly distinguish
between limitations imposing restraints on alienation for a long
period of time and limitations providing for the vesting of an
estate at a remote period. Professor' Gray so forcefully and
so persistently pointed out that the rule was one against remote-
ness of vesting that today his interpretation of the rule has come
to be generally accepted.
Long before this view of the rule against perpetuities was
accepted several of. our states adopted statutes similar to Sec-
tion 2360 of the Kentucky Statutes, thirteen in all. The first
was that of New York, adopted in 1828. In drawing this act in
New York, as Professor Rundell has pointed out in his learned
article in the Michigan Law Review," the revisers intended to
state the rule against perpetuities as it was then understood
and not to alter its fundamentals.
These statutes confused the law as to perpetuities rather
than clarified it. Professor Gray in considering the Iowa and
the Kentucky Statutes, which are almost identical asked "Is
the statute provision a substitute for the common law rule, or
to be taken as an addition to it?' 12
The common law rule against perpetuities as formulated by
Professor Gray is as follows: "No interest is good unless it
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest."' 3  That seems to
10 The Rule Against Perpetuities (rd Ed.), Section 269; Professor
Percy Bordwell, 10 Ia. L. Bulletin 275, 292; Professor Oliver S. Rundell,
19 Mich. L. Rev., 235.
119 Mich. L. Rev. 235, 242.
"The Rule Against Perpetuitties (3rd Ed.), Section 736, 737.
"Ibid., Section 201.
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be a very different proposition from the rule laid down in Sec-
tion 2360, Kentucky Statutes, that "the absolute power of alien-
ation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition what-
ever, for a longer period than during the continuance of life or
lives in being at the creation of the estate, and twenty-one years
and ten months thereafter."
An. examination of the cases, however, shows that except
in a few instances the Court of Appeals has regarded the stat-
utory provision as intended for a statement of the common law
rule. In some cases they have expressly so said and have regarded
the rule as one against remoteness of vesting. In Page, etc. v.
Frazier's Executors,14 the court held valid a devise that was to
take effect one year after the death of a person living at the
time of the testator's death as it was within the limit fixed by
the statute. In Brumley v. Brumley,15 a "provision in the
deed for the benefit of the great-grandchildren is void, because
in contravention of the statute against perpetuities, Section
2360 Ky. St."
A question of remoteness of vesting was also before the
court in Brown v. Columbia Finance & Trust Co.16 After quot-
ing Section 2360, the court said: "Under this statute and under
the rule against the creation of perpetuities, the validity of any
future estate depends upon the certainty of its vesting within
the prescribed period, and this certainty must exist at the time
of the creation of the estate." Again in Kasey v. Fidelity Trust
Co. 17 we find such a statement as this: "Neither the rule nor
the statute against perpetuities has any application to rever-
sions." The next case raising the question of remote vesting of
estates was U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Douglas.18  The
court made no mention of Section 2360 but referred to the rule
against perpetuities as laid down in the early cases of Moore's
Trustees v. Howe's Heirs19 and Ludwig v. Combs.20  In quoting
from the latter case, which was decided some six years after the
statute was enacted, the court gives the period within which a
24 (1878) 14 Bush 205.
(1905) 28 Ky. L. Rep. 231, 89 S. W. 182.
11(1906) 123 Ky. 775, 97 S. W. 421.
1 (1909) 131 Ky. 609, 115 S. W. 739.
(1909) 134 Ky. 314, 120 S. W. 328.
(1826) 4 T. B. Mon. 199.
(1858) Metel. 128.
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limitation must vest as twenty-one years and nine months after
a life or lives in being at the time of its creation, but later in
the opinion mentions twenty-one years and ten months after a
life or lives in being at the time of the creation of the estate as
marking the limit. This mention of ten months seems to indicate
that the court had the statute in mind as well as the commaon law
rule which regarded twenty-one years and nine months after a
life or lives in being as the period.
In Beall et al. v. Wilson et al.,2 1 a limitation over, which
might vest beyond the period allowed, was held void as a perpet-
uity within the prohibition of Section 2360, Kentucky Statutes.
The next case bearing upon the point of remote vesting was
Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co.22 Judge Miller, speak-
ing for the court, said: "While the rule denouncing perpetuities
has been in the form of a statute only since 1852, it was a
doctrine well known and well established under the common law,
and in force in Kentucky prior to the enactment of the Statute
of 1852." He then refers to the rule as being one against re-
straints on alienation and still further along as one against
remote vesting. To quote his language: "This wise policy of
the law which thus restricts the power of the owner of property
to prevent its alienation beyond a reasonable period, is the result
of long experience and has become firmly rooted in the juris-
prudence of both England and the several states of the Union."
Still further along he says: "The test, therefore, for determin-
ing the existence of a perpetuity, is not whether the event or
contingency named upon which the estate devised may vest in
the ultimate takers does happen or may happen, but whether it is
possible that it might not happen within that time. If it is
possible that the event or contingency upon which the estate
will finally vest may not happen within the limit prescribed by
the rule against perpetuities, the instrument is void, or at least
so much thereof is void as relates to this remote event or con-
tingency. In other words, a possible perpetuity is a perpetuity
denounced by the statute."
This reminds one of the English canes on the subject before
the famous decision in London & South-Western By. Co. v.
(1912) 146 Ky. 646, 143 S. W. 55.
(1914) 158 Ky. 280, 164 S. W. 939.
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Gomm, 2 3 when the English court freed itself from the legacies
left it by Washburn v. Doumes24 and Scatterwood v. Edge
25 and
settled the law on the point in England as a rule against remote-
ness of vesting.
A later case involving the question of the validity of an
estate that was to vest at a temote period was Curd's Trustee v.
Curd et al.26  The court observed: "There have been many
eases in this court, particularly during the last twenty years,
construing and applying the Kentucky Statute against perpe-
tuities; but in none of them is the doctrine and the reason there-
for better stated than in the opinion of Chief Justice Boyle, in
the early case of Moore's Trustee v. Howe's Heirs, 4 T. B. Mon.
199." (1826).
Finally two recent cases raising the question of the validity
of estates vesting at remote periods, are Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Tiffany27 and Clay v. Anderson.28 In the former
the court said: "The whole question depends upon whether the
common law rule against perpetuities, and our statute which is
merely declaratory of that rule, are applicable to the devises
to the grandchildren, or any of them, in the quoted provisions
of the will." In the latter case the court was equally as clear.
After quoting Section 2360, the court says: "That section of
the statute means that 'no limited or conditional estate may
ever be carved from the fee that may extend and postpone the
vesting of the remainder interest for a longer period of time
than for the duration og the life or lives of the person or per-
sons in being at the creation of such estate, and twenty-one years
and ten months thereafter."
On the other hand there is a line of cases having nothing
to do with remoteness of vesting, in which cases the court has
said that attempts to restrain the alienation of property were
violations of Section 2360, in which cases the court has lost
sight of the fact that it has at other times alleged that Section
2360 was merely declaratory of the common law rule against
perpetuities and has treated it as a rule against restraints on
2 (1882) 20 Ch. Div. 562.
24 Note 7.
(1672) 1 Ch. Cas. 213.
21(1915) 163 Ky. 472, 173 S. W. 1148.
21(1924) 202 Ky. 618, 260 S. W. 357.
(1924) 203 Ky. 384, 262 S. W. 604.
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alienation. It has held that a provision in a will for making
a perpetual investment of property violated the statute,2 9 that
the direction to keep an estate in trust for forty years was void
under the statuate,30 that conditions that land should never be
sold came within its terms,3 ' and that qualifications that land
should not be alienated for a certain number of years, fifty-four
years in one case 32 and twenty-eight in another,33 were bad be-
cause of Section 2360. Also, it has been held that certain re-
strictions were not. contrary to the statute, that land should not
be sold during the lifetime of the life tenant,3 4 nor during the
lifetime of the grantor,35 nor for a period of twenty years. 6
Possibly greater confusion has arisen in our problem, as the
cases just cited might suggest, from the fact that in Kentucky,
contrary to the general rule elsewhere, a partial restraint as to
time is allowed on the alienation of fees. The cases in which
such restraints have been upheld do not purport to rest upon
Section 2360 nor is the statute referred to in the opinions. The
most outstanding decisions in this group are Lawson v. Light-
foot3" and Harkness v. Lisle.38 In the Tawson case the court in
upholding a restriction against selling land during the lifetime
of the testator's widow, observed: "That accepted doctrine
in this state is that restraints upon alination may be im-
posed for a reasonable period. The court has, however, never
fixed a limit to such restraint." In the Harkness case the court
held void a provision against selling or encumbering an estate
during the lifetime of any of the grantor's children. A re-
straint against selling before a devisee arrived at the age of
thirty-five years has been held valid; 39 also, one until the de-
"Ernst v. Shinkie (1894), 95 Ky. 608, 26 S. W. 813.
OStevens v. Stevens (1900), 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1315, 54 S. W. 835.
31 Morton's'GZ'n v. Morton (1906), 120 Ky. 251, 85 S. W. 1188, Rob-
inson v. Gray (1906), 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1296, 97 S. W. 347, Gillespie v.
Winston's Trustees (1916), 170 Ky. 667, 186 S. W. 517.
mSaulsberry v. Saulsberry (1910), 140 Ky. 608, 131 S. W. 491.
m Perry v. Metcalf (1926), 216 Ky. 755, 288 S. W. 694.
" Sparrow v. Sparrow (1916), 171 Ky. 101, 186 S. W. 904
"Pond Creek Coal Co. v. Runyan (1914), 161 Ky. 64, 170 S. W. 501.
Cooper v. Knuckles (1926), 212 Ky. 608, 279 S. W. 1084.
(1905) 27 Ky. L. Rep. 217, 84 S. W. 739.
(1909) 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264.
'Stewart v. Barrow (1870), 7 Bush 368; Smith v. Isaacs (1904),
25 Ky. L. Rep. 1727, 78 S. W. 434; Wallace v. Smith (1902), 113 Ky. 263,
68 S. W. 131.
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visee reached the age of twenty-eight;40 a restriction against
selling for a period of twenty years after the testator's death,
was valid ;41 as well as one for the lives of the join life ten-
ants ;42 and restraints were held reasonable when for the grant-
or's lifetime.43 On the other hand, a restraint for the lifetime
of the grantee or devisee has several times been held bad.44 Judge
Thomas was doubtless correct when in his opinion in the Cam-
mack case he said that Section 2360 was not applicable to the
question involved in these cases.
In conclusion, it seems fair to say that a survey of the cases
involving Section 2360, Kentucky Statutes, shows that Judge
Thomas' conclusion reached in Cammacn v. Allen1 4 5 rather than
the one he arrived at in Perry v. Metcalf4 6 is the correct one. In
the first case he said: "It has been a statute of this state for a
long number of years and has always been treated and referred
to in the opinions of this court as Kentucky's statute against per-
petuities. Long since its enactment and while it was a live and a
vital statute of this state, all of the opinions, supra, on the power
to restrain alienation were rendered and in each of them the
question was as to the right to restrain alienation of the fee by
a person to whom it was conveyed and was considered from the
standpoint of the common law rule upon the subject and the
right to impose partial restraints was grafted on to the common
law rule by this court as a pro tanto exception thereto. In none
of the opinions was the statute referred to as creating a rule
with reference to the imposition of such restraints, but, as stated,
in numerous cases it was referred to as our statute against per-
petuities."
It also seems fair to conclude that had the attempt to put
the rule in statutory form not been made until after the Gomm
case had been decided in England and Professor Gray's influ-
ence had begun to make itself felt in, this country, the statute
40KeaWg Gd'n. v. Kean (1892), 13 Ky. L. Rep. 956, 19 S. W. 184.
4Johnson v. Dumeyer (1904), 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2243, 66 S. W. 1035,
Call v. Shewmaker (1902), 24 Ky. L. Rep. 686, 69 S. W. 749.
1 Morton's GZ' n v. Morton (1905), 120 Ky. 251, 85 S. W. 1188.
'3Frazier v. Combs (1910), 140 Ky. 77, 130 S. W. 812; Kentland Coal
& Coke Co. v. Keen (1916), 168 Ky. 836, 183 S. W. 247.
"Cropper v. Bowles (1912), 150 Ky. 393, 150 S. W. 330; Thurmond
v. Thurmond (1921), 190 Ky. 582, 228 S. W. 29.
41 Note 2.
41Note 3.
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-would not have been worked in such a way as to perpetuate what
Professor Gray has pointed out as the erroneous view set forth
in Scatterwood v. Edge. It would have been expressed in terms
that would make it clear that the rule is one against remote vest-
ing of estates.
W. LEwIS R OBERTS
University o4 Kentucky,
College of Law
